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The Kentucky court apparently has seen the reasons against
attempting to effectuate the testator's intention in this jurisdiction by
an application of the rule of Wild's Case and has consistently held
that a life estate should go to the parent with remainder to his chil-
dren. In situations analogous to the first proposition in that case
this is logical, for the children are not in being and the fee tail of
ild's Case cannot be effectuated in this state. The supposed intention
of the testator is secured under the Kentucky holding, while it could
not be achieved by an application of the principles of Wild's Case.
In situations similar to proposition two, the court's holdings have
been consistent with its decisions under the first rule. If Simes is
correct in his criticism of the distinction between situations in which
there are children and those in which there are none in esse at the
time of the testator's death, then that is another reason for refusing
to follow Wild's Case. But what is more important is that in Ken-
tucky a fee simple is presumed where there is any doubt as to the
quantity of the estate to be taken, thus giving A and his children a
joint tenancy in fee simple instead of a joint tenancy for life as in
Wild's Case. The court has rejected this alternative as not being in
accord with the testator's intention, because he would never have
meant to give in such a manner that the exact estate which each
would hold would be so uncertain. Thus the Kentucky court's interpre-
tation of situations similar to proposition two of Wild's Case is no less
logical than the one there embodied.
B. H. H-a Aw
GROUNDS FOR DISBARMENT AND SUSPENSION IN KENTUCKY.
The Court of Appeals has often stated that suspension and dis-
barment are not means of punishment, but are designed to protect the
bar and the court and to promote the administration of justice.1 How-
v. Union Trust Co., 235 Pa. 610, 84 Atl. 512 (1912) (stating that the
second proposition in Wild's Case is not law in Pa.); Keown's Estate,
238 Pa. 343, 86 Ati. 270 (1913); Scruggs v. Mayberry, 135 Tenn.
(8 Thomp.) 586, 188 S. W. 207 (1916).
z See cases cited, supra, note 2.
' Bakerv. Commonwealth, 73 Ky. 592 (1874): "it would be unjust
to the profession .... and a disregard of public welfare to permit an
attorney who has forfeited his right to public confidence to continue
(to practice)"; Chreste v. Commonwealth, 178 Ky. 311, 198 S. W. 929,
933 (1917): "It is recognized that . . . (disbarment) - . . is not in its
nature a punishment . . . but is inflicted with a view of purifying and
maintaining the high standard for integrity so essential to the office of
attorney at law"; Accord: Lenihan v. Commonwealth, 165 Ky. 93,
176 S. W. 948, 955 (1915): "The purpose of disbarment is not to punish
the attorney, but to protect the court and the administration of justice
. . Commonwealth v. Porter, 242 Ky. 561, 46 S. W. (2d) 1096, 1097
(1932): "The purpose of a disbarment proceeding is not to punish
the attorney but to protect the court in the administration of justice."
For general treatment of the subject of this note see: Warvelle, Legal
Ethics (19.02) sees. 65, 68, 69, 73, 74; Cohen, The Law: Business or
Profession? (1924), pp. 1-23; Bolts, Ethics for Success at the Bar
(1928) pp. 17-37; Brown, Lawyers and the Promotion of Justice
(1938) pp. 210-215.
STUDENT NOTES 337
ever, either one, but especially disbarment is a serious handicap to the
one so suspended or disbarred. He is deprived of his usual means of
livelihood for a varing period of time, perhaps permanently and he
acquires a reputation which is difficult indeed for him to overcome.
For these reasons, and the additional one that "(lawyers) . . . do not
want to get mixed up in such a dirty mess"2 (disbarment or suspen-
sion proceedings), there are few investigations of cases of unprofes-
sional conduct, and fewer still are the cases found to warrant action.3
It has been suggested that "(an integrated bar association) . . .
generally brings more disbarment proceedings than do local bar
associations". 4 Although there has been no marked increase in cases
of disciplinary nature in the Court of Appeals since 1934, the date of
the establishment of the integrated bar in this state, it may not be
inferred that discipline has become lax under the new order. The
Board of Bar Commisisoners are empowered to take action by public
or private reprimand without reporting the case to the Court of
Appeals.6 However, since suspension or disbarment requires action by
the Court,' it follows that there has been no increase of such actions
by reason of the new State Bar Association. Perhaps such drastic action
is not regarded as necessary by the Board to maintain a high standard
of ethics. The fact that the lawyers themselves are the ones who must
maintain and raise their standards of conduct is shown by the identity
of the persons who have initiated inquiries into the professional con-
duct of members of the bar. The instigators of such investigations have
without exception been either other lawyers or the local bar associa-
'Brown, Lawyers and the Administration of Justice (1938) 212.
*Id. at 213. About one per cent of the complaints brought before
the Association of the Bar of the City New York result in punishment
of the offender. That percentage is probably typical of the whole
country. As to its applicability to this state, see Caldwell, the Problems
of the Kentucky State Bar and Their Solution (1936); Michigan Sec-
tion (A Supplement to the Michigan Law Review), Vol. 1, Nos. 3, 47,
54: "As our first Board of Commissioners was organized November 26,
1934, . . . the actual handling of complaints was not begun until early
In 1935. Of the 21 complaints that were handled by the board during
the year five were adjusted to the satisfaction of the parties and with-
drawn by consent, seven were dismissed as groundless following inves-
tigations and two . . . were pending. . . . Of the remaining seven
which were referred to Trial Committees for hearing, one was pending
at the close of the year and six had been prosecuted to final awards
before the Board of Commissioners. "Of these six cases passed on by the
Board, one was dismissed upon recommendation of the Trial Commit-
tee; in the other five, the charges were sustained and disciplinary
action by the court recommended, including recommendation of dis-
barment in three cases and suspension in the other two."
IId. at 214, n. 1.
'Carroll's Ky. Stat. (1936), sec. 101-1 (enacted in 1934).
4 Rule 13, Practice and Procedure for Disciplining, Suspending and
Disbarring Attorneys-at-Law. (This is a supplement to the Proceed-
ings of the Kentucky State Bar Association for each year since 1935.
Cited herewith as "rule--".)1 IJ. Rule 13.
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tion.' This Is true although anyone may do so,' and there is wide-
spread distrust of the lawyer by the layman.
GROUNDS FOR DISBARMENT
Grounds for disbarment may be statutory or non-statutory. Statu-
tory causes are those which popular opinion required to be set out
by the legislature because of the intense feeling against the Commis-
sion. Non-statutory causes are those which the court has established
in the exercises of its inherent power to regulate its bar. (It may be
assumed that there is a stronger policy against those acts which con-
stituted the statutory causes of disbarment.)
A. NoN-STATuToaY CAUSES FOp DIsBium=
1. Character Conduct in General
A certificate of character signed by the Circuit Judge and the
Commonwealth's attorney of the applicant's home judicial district is a
prerequisite for permission to take the bar examination in Kentucky.
The Court of Appeals reasons that one must have a good reputation
before he can be admitted to the bar, and must retain it in order to
continue his membership.10 Then the first cause for disbarment to be
considered is that of a bad character. Although that ground is some-
what general, the conception of the meaning of "bad character" is too
indefinite to enable us to avoid the appearance of evil. It will not be
amiss to recite some examples of conduct which have been held
reprehensible.
In one case a lawyer erased words in a letter he was to deliver
from one judge to another, so that the meaning was changed from
"no" to "yes.' The alteration resulted in the release on bail of a
relative of the offender. Again, the sale of liquor by the county
attorney of a dry county (under local option) has been condemned. '2
That was compared to the acquisition of an interest adverse to one's
client, since the attorney was required to enforce the law which he
disobeyed. The procurement of employment in a pending suit in
exchange for furnishing the name of an important witness, and the
8 See Commonwealth v. Harrington, 256 Ky. 41, 98 S. W. (2d) 53
(1936); Be Sparks, 261 Ky. 93, 101 S. W. (2d) 194 (1937); Common-
wealth v. Ward, 265 Ky. 627, 103 S. W. (2d) 117 (1937); in Re Gilbert,
274 Ky. 187, 118 S. W. (2d) 535 (1938).
9 Rule 12.
' OUnderwood v. Commonwealth, 32 Ky. Law Rep. 32, 105 S. W.
151 (1907). Accord: Nelson v. Commonwealth, 128 Ky. 779, 109 S. W.
337 (1908); Commonwealth v. Roe, 129 Ky. 650, 112 S. W. 683 (1908).
1 Baker v. Commonwealth, 73 Ky. 592 (1875). The addressee had
asked the writer for an opinion about his jurisdiction in defendant's
relative's case.
-Underwood v. Commonwealth, 32 Ky. Law Rep. 32, 105 S. W. 151
(1907).
'- Chreste v. Commonwealth, 178 Ky. 311, 198 S. W. 929 (1908); cf.
Commonwealth v. Stump, 247 Ky. 589, 57 S. W. (2d) 524 (1933).
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solicitation of employment through an intermediary have been held
evidence of such bad character as to warrant disbarment.1 ' So defend-
ant's instigating a suit while the claim sued on was in the process
of settlement, and making deceitful representations concerning the
necessity of appointing a guardian for the infant plaintiff warrants
suspension."
Most of these situations are not provided for by statute. Under
these circumstances the conduct has been described as ". . . grossly
unprofessional or dishonorable . . . of a character likely to deceive
or defraud a client or the public."" It is not necessary that the offense
be criminal" or be performed while the attorney is occupied in the
discharge of his duties as an attorney." The effect of the conduct
must be to deprive the public of confidence in the attorney." Gross
negligence alone in the conduct of one's business is not evidence
of such bad character." It has been suggested that each case involv-
ing a charge of bad character rests on its own facts." This method
of handling such cases results in a flexible rule which can accom-
modate itself to the circumstances.
(a) Falsification or abstraction of records and papers
The falsification of records or papers used in a trial is justly
actionable as a fraud on the court and an obstruction to the adminis-
tration of justice. Thus in Rice v. Commonwealt =, one Rice altered
a letter which was to be offered in evidence by his co-counsel by add-
ing the word "Pres.", to the signature. This act made it appear that
the letter had been written by the sender in his official capacity as
president of the Kentucky Trust Company. The letter having been
offered in evidence by the co-counsel, the attorney who altered it
was disbarred. This seems to be harsh action in this case, and it
is submitted that a suspension would have been sufficient to dis-
courage such a practice on the part of this offender.
A related problem is the filing of a paper which apparently has
been altered, without an investigation to determine its correctness.
It has been held that such failure warrants a reprimand by the court."
"'Chreste v. Commonwealth, 178 Ky. 311, 198 S. W. 929 (1917).
Solicitation In person by the attorney is condemned in Lenihan v.
Commonwealth, 165 Ky. 93, 176 S. W. 948, 952 (1915).
1Lenihan v. Commonwealth, 165 Ky. 93, 176 S. W. 948 (1915).
26 Rule 12.
21 Chreste v. Commonwealth, 178 Ky. 311, 198 S. W. 929 (1917);
cf. Baker v. Commonwealth, 73 Ky. 592, 598 (1874); Underwood v.
Commonwealth, 32 Ky. Law Rep. 32, 105 S. W. 151 (1907).
"See Baker v. Commonwealth, 73 Ky. 592 (1874); Underwood v.
Commonwealth, 32 Ky. Law Rep. 32, 105 S. W. 151 (1907).
"Baker v. Commonwealth, 73 Ky. 592, 597, 598 (1875); Chreste v.
Commonwealth, 178 Ky. 311, 198 S. W. 933 (1917); cf. Underwood v.
Commonwealth, 32 Ky. Law Rep. 32, 105 S. W. 151 (1907); Rule 12.
2Duffln v. Commonwealth, 208 Ky. 452, 272 S. W. 555 (1925).
3 Commonwealth v. Roe, 129 Ky. 600, 112 S. W. 683 (1908).
57 Ky. 472 (1857).
3Sparks v. Commonwealth, 225 Ky. 334, 8 S. W. (2d) 397 (1928).
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It is suggested such conduct if grossly negligent would be as culpable
as the act of making the alteration and should be punished with a
suspension. Another fraud on the court is the abstraction of material
from court files when a suit is pending on the material stolen. This
offense has been declared to be grounds for disbarment.'
(b) Deception of the Court; obstruction of the administration
of justice
The placing on file of depositions falsely certified to have been
taken before a named notary in Ohio when in fact they had been
taken in Kentucky in the absence of a notary,n and the falsification
of a deposition by the addition of questions and answers after it was
completed2 have been condemned as acts of gross professional mis-
conduct warranting disbarment. They constitute a fraud on the court
which may not be overlooked.
The obstruction of the administration of justice by an attorney,
who is an officer of the court, is a serious offense. In the only Ken-
tucky case on this subject the offender was disbarred. The charge
was that of paying a witness not to appear against the defendant's
client in a criminal prosecution.
(c) Gross contempt of court
Gross contempt of court was formerly a ground for disbarmenta
The wisdom of this attitude is shown by In Re 'Wooley'. One Wooley
in a petition to the Court of Appeals for a rehearing stated that the
court had overlooked the facts of his case, had assumed facts not in
the record, and had ignored others which appeared; that the court
was careless of the rights of a litigant; that the result of this was
a ruinous, disastrous and unjust judgment against a party wholly
innocent of all offense. He was disbarred, and his conduct was classi-
fied as a disparagement of the court. Subsequent to the Woolev case
a statute was passed limiting the punishment for contempt without
the intervention of a jury to thirty dollars and/or thirty hours.' In
Adams v. Gardner,n this statute was held to preclude suspension for
contempt. The reasoning in that case that the statutory methods of
punishment were exclusive would prevent disbarment under the cir-
cumstances of the TWoo~ey case. Such a result is unfortunate, depriv-
ing the court of the right to punish a gross contempt which tends
to bring it into public disrepute.
(d) Misconduct toward the client
There are certain types of dishonesty toward the client which
have been held to require disbarment. "Selling out" to the other
2' Commonwealth v. Ward, 265 Ky. 627, 103 S. W. (2d) 117 (1937).
2 Davis v. Commonwealth, 223 Ky. 90, 2 S. W. (2d) 1038 (1928).
' In re Gilbert, 274 Ky. 187, 118 S. W. (2d) 535 (1938).
21Taylor v. Commonwealth, 192 Ky. 410, 233 S. W. 895 (1921).
21 In re Wooley, 74 Ky. 95 (1874).
9 Ibid.
0 Carroll's Ky. Stat. (1936), see. 1291.
176 Ky. 252, 195 S. W. 412 (1917).
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party,2 failure to act when the time to act has arrived,1' and fraudu-
lent conduct toward the client are examples." An interesting factual
set-up occurred in Re McDonald." There the defendant attorney rep-
resented to his client that he had obtained a divorce for him while
in fact he had not. The client remarried, and the attorney's breach
of duty was brought to light when the client was prosecuted for
bigamy. Defendant was disbarred.
B. STATUTOny GnouNDs Fon DIsBAm ENT
1. Convictiom of criminal offenses; the commission of acts for
which liability to prosecution arises.
The state legislature has provided that conviction of treason or
of a felony shall be cause for disbarment." This has been extended
by rule of the Court of Appeals to include conviction under federal
law.27 The conviction is the thing for which disbarment is prescribed,
and conviction is held to be conclusive evidence of guilt, requiring
disbarment."' The fact that the attorney may be pardoned for the
offense before the disbarment proceedings is no defense." The case
of Beckner v. Commonwealth" suggests an interesting, but anomalous
exception to this rule. Beckner represented the defendant, Harrison,
In a suit which the defendant lost. The plaintiff sued on the judg-
ment, which he had obtained against Harrison, in England. To
prevent summary proceedings, Beckner drew up for his former client
a false affidavit to support a charge of unfairness and fraud on the
part of the trial judge. Beckner's affidavit was presented in the suit
in the English court, and he was later suspended for having com-
mitted acts rendering him liable to prosecution for perjury. This
judgment was reversed on appeal, the court stating that a witness
should not be harassed except by a criminal prosecution for perjury,
on account of any statement he may make as a witness. The court
further said that an attorney who is a witness can claim this pro-
tection.
Both perjury and false swearing are felonies in this state," and
the court usually disbars the one who commits those acts for which
liability to criminal prosecution exists.& " Under this principle Beckner
10Tudor v. Commonwealth, 27 Ky. Law Rep. 87, 84 S. W. 522
(1905).
"Re Gilbert, 274 Ky. 187, 118 S. W. (2d) 535 (1938).
"Commonwealth v. Harrington, 266 Ky. 41, 98 S. W. (2d) 53
(1936); Re Sparks, 261 Ky. 93, 101 S. W. (2d) 194 (1937).
157 Ky. 93, 162 S. W. 66 (1914).
"'Carroll's Ky. Stat. (1936), sec. 97.
Rule 12.
Commonwealth v. Porter, 242 Ky. 561, 46 S. W. (2d) 1096 (1932).
*Nelson v. Commonwealth, 128 Ky. 779, 109 S. W. 337 (1908).
126 Ky. 318, 103 S. W. 378 (1907). But see Re Ulmer, 208 Fed.
461 (1913); Re Thorn, 164 App. Div. 151, 149 N. Y. S. 507 (1914);
Re Nichols, 165 App. Div. 901, 149 N. Y. S. 1099 (1914).
"Carroll's Ky. Stat. (1936), secs. 1173, 1174.
"Rule 12.
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would have been disbarred but for the fact that his offense was per-
jury, and he could claim a right to be punished only in a criminal
trial. The decision in the Beckner case is subject to criticism in that
it loses sight of the policy which looks to the maintenance of an honest
bar. This policy should be deemed controlling although its effect is
to deny to attorneys who are witnesses freedom from proceedings
other than criminal action as a result of their testimony. The com-
mission of perjury by an attorney could be held to constitute evidence
of bad character. Then the attorney-witness could be disbarred with-
out overruling the Beckner case. If that is not possible, the effect
of the Beckner case in its fullest implications is certainly unfortunate,
since it must be admitted that one who has been guilty of perjury
is not a fit person to remain a member of the profession.
Rule twelve" of the Court of Appeals' rules relating to disbar-
ment extends the statute by providing for the investigation of ".. . any
professional act for which liability to prosecution exists under the
laws of this state or of the United States. . . ." This Includes both
felonies and misdemeanors and is broad enough to include civil prose-
cution. Its implications would tend to making obedience to traffic
regulations and the regular payment of bills of vital Importance to
an attorney. However, an examination of the entire rule leads to
the belief that such trifling offenses are not grounds for its applica-
tion. A misdemeanor which involves moral turpitude and invites the
Imposition of a heavy fine and/or jail sentence may require serious
consideration.
2. The payment of dues of other members by nominees for offices
in the State Bar Association.
The payment of dues of other members by nominees for office in
the State Bar Association is declared to constitute "unprofessional
conduct"" but the effect of it is not stated. Since rule twelve of the
Court of Appeals rules relating to disbarment provides for an investi-
gation of acts of "professional misconduct" with a view to taking the
proper disciplinary action, it is suggested that a flagrant case of dues-
paying by nominees may result in suspension or disbarment.
GROUNDS FOR SUSPENSION
It may be stated generally that any act which is described supra
as a cause for disbarment may be considered to warrant suspension
only when there are extenuating circumstances in favor of the accused.
A. ST.&TUToaY GROUNDs Foa Sus ENSIOIr
1. Misappropriation of the client's money.
A very important part of every attorney's relation with his client
is the matter of the collection of money judgments. That is covered
4See n. 6, supra.
"Rule 5.
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by a statute which provides:45 "if an attorney . . . shall collect the
money of his client, and, on demand, wrongfully neglect or refuse to
pay over the same, the circuit court ... shall ... suspend him from
practice in any court for twelve months and until the money shall
be paid ... A demand for the money shall be made of such attorney
in the county of his residence..."
Attention is called in Bvans v. Wadel4 to the fact that the money
which Is withheld must have been collected from a third person for
the client and not be money paid the attorney under a contract of
employment. That case arose over the amount of a fee in dispute.
The necessity of a demand by the client in order to afford the attorney
an opportunity to repay the sum claimed before suit was instituted,
was emphasized. A bona fide refusal to pay over was held a good
defense In a proceeding under the statute in Bonnet v. GoodloeT which
stressed the word "wrongful." Denney v. Commonwealth" asserted the
following principles on this question: A reasonable delay in payment
after demand Is not wrongful; the reasonableness of the delay depends
on the circumstances in each case; a delay of ten moiiths after col-
lection and three months after demand is not reasonable.
2. Failure to pay dues to the State Bar Association.
Another ground for suspension is the omission to pay dues to the
State Bar Association." Suspension for that reason Is for the period
of default, and may take effect only after a rule from the Court of
Appeals has been directed toward the delinquent member.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion it may be stated that the decided grounds so far for
disbarment in Kentucky are: (1) evincing a bad character; (2) the
commission of an act which may be the subject of a criminal prose-
cution under state or federal law; (3) treason on the part of the
attorney or the conviction of a felony (except perjury); and perhaps
(4) the payment of dues of other members by nominees for offices
In the State Bar Association. The causes for suspension are: (1) mis-
appropriation of the client's money, and (2) failure to pay dues to
the State Bar Association.
There is little reason to take the risk of a disciplinary proceed-
ing In the event of a doubtful course of conduct in view of rule
seventeen of the rules promulgated by the Court of Appeals. This
rule provides for advisory opinions on the propriety of a contemplated
professional act or course of conduct to be rendered by the Board of
Bar Commissioners of the State Bar Association. There Is also a right
of appeal to the Court of Appeals. These opinions will be rendered on
application of any member of the Association. Suspension for the
non-payment of dues to the Association may be avoided by becoming
"Carroll's Ky. Stat. (1936), sec. 104.
212 Ky. 238, 278 S. W. 604 (1925).
'205 Ky. 555, 266 S. W. 62 (1924).
175 Ky. 357, 194 S. W. 330 (1917,).
"Rule S. (Rule made returnable on Nov. 20 of this year.)
K L. J.-6
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a retired member. Retirement is accomplished by directing a request
therefor to the Secretary of the Association.0
The Bar Association has not taken many cases Involving ethical
questions to the Court of Appeals, but it should not be condemned
on that point. It has been in existence for only about five years," and
there is another method which is not subject to the surveillance of
the Court by which to enforce discipline.
J. PAUL CUnay
mRule 9.
nThe Integrated Bar Act (Ky. Stat., see. 101-1) was passed in 1934.
